我国企业并购融资问题的探讨本科毕业论文(编辑修改稿)

我国企业并购融资问题的探讨本科毕业论文(编辑修改稿)内容摘要：

]财会 通讯， 2020（ 03）： 25— 26。 [21] 陈曦，上市公司并购支付方式研究现状综述， [J]西南金融， 2020（ 09）：66— 68。 [22] 冯程程，林艳，国有企业并购财务风险的分析与防范， [N]中国集团经济， 2020（ 09）： 5— 59。 [23]田影 .浅谈我国企业并购融资的现状与对策， [J]中国乡镇企业会计2020 16 [24]Anil effect of bank financing in acquisition， Journal of Economics， 2020 21— 41 [25] ,James structure of corporate ownership： Causes and consequences， Journal of Political Economy， 2020 15— 34 [26]， Jensen ， Macklin， Theory of the Firm： Managerial Behavior，Agency Costs and Ownership Structure， Journal of Financial Economics，2020 44— 50 江 汉 大 学 文 理 学 院 College of Arts amp。 Science of Jianghan University 毕业论文 外文翻译 部 （系） 商学部 _____ 专 业 财务管理 姓 名 陈晓晴 学 号 202001202045 指导老师 许建业 2020 年 4 月 25 日 外文来源 W ha t determi nes the fi na nci ng deci s i o n i n co rpo ra te ta keo v ers 中文翻译 企业并购中融资决策的影响因素 What determines the financing decision in corporate takeovers ( Mar in a Mar t yn o v a an d Lu c Ren n eb o o g ，2020“What Determines the financing decision in co r p o r at e tak er o v er s : Co s t o f Cap i t al , A g en c y Problems ,or the Means of Payment ?”Journal of Co r p o r ate f in an ce , Vo lu m e 15 I s s u e 3 , P P 290 3 1 5. ) The empirical literature has given notable attention in recent years to the choice of the means of panment in corporate takeovers . In this literature ,the tem “means of panment ” is usually considered as synonymous to the “ sources of takeover financing” . We consider how the choice of sources of funding of mergers and acquisitions and the mens of panment is affected by the bidders‟ concerns with respect to the risk of overpayment for the target (Hansen , 1987) , the risk of a change in the firm‟s control structure ( Faccio and Masulis , 2020) ,and the risk of a bid‟s failure ( Fishman , 1989) . Our main findings are that the financing decision is explained by pecking order preferences , the need of flexibility in managing corporate funds , and the corporate governance environment that influences the costs of external capital . We find noevidence that that financing decision is driven by potential agency conflicts between manager and shareholders , or between shareholders and creditors . There is evidence that the choice of equity versus internal cash or debt financing is influenced by the bidder‟s strategic preferences with respect to the means of payment . A nested logit analysis reveals that the payment decision depends on the degree to which the bidder‟s large shareholders wish to retain control after the takerover , and on the intention of the bidder‟s shareholders to share the risk of the transaction with the taget‟s shareholder or to buy all shareholder out . These factors do not directly influence the financing decision ,but only indirectly though the means of panment choice . Therefore , we conclude that the two decision on the means of panment and on the sources of financing in corporate takeovers are driven by distinct deteminants . The analysis of the valuation effect of takeovers that are fi nanced with different sources reveals that investors differentiate between the information about the panment method and the sources of takeover financing . These investors do take both the payment method and financing souces into account when valuing a takeover . A significantly negative price revision following the announcement of a takeover frequently arises in case of M amp。 As fully paid with equity but also of takeovers that involve equity financing . We also find that acquisitions financed with internally generated funds underperform debtfinanced deals , suggesting that investors are wary that cashfinanced deals may be driven by managerial empire building motives . In contrast ,debt financing conveys a positive signal to the market that the firm‟s shares may not be overvalued and that the takeover is profitable . Thus , the bidder‟s financing decision has a significant impact on the market reaction to the takeover announcement . Our evidence shows that previous research that partitioned takeover bids into cash versus equity offers is an oversimplification of the reality . The determinants of the financing decision An extensive body of theoretical reseach on the determinants of corporate financing decision can be partitioned into two dominant explanations : cost of capital considerations and agency related issues . The former explanation upholds that market imperfections or institutional rigidities , such as information asymmetries ( Myers and Majluf , 1984 ) ,legal protection of shareholders and creitors (La Porta etal , 1998 ) , or taxes ( Modigliani and Miller , 1963 ) may disproportionally affect the costs of debt and equity capital . The latter explanation endorses that a firm issues specific securities to mitigate agency problems between its management , shareholders , and creditors ( Myers , 1997 ) . For the financing decision in corporate takeovers in particular ,we propose a third explanation。 the preferred payment mode in the takeover deal may influence the financing sources chosen by the bidding firm .price downwards when equity financing is announced ( Myers and Majluf ,1984 ) .Managers attempt to time equity issues to coincide with surging stock markets or even with the peak of the stock market cycle ( Baker , 2020 ) .This overvaluation argument may be more pronounced for M amp。 As entirely financed and paid with equity . Shleifer and Vishny ( 2020 ) and RhodesKropf and Vishwanathan ( 2020 ) argue that overvalued bidders use equity to buy real assets of undervalued targets to take advantage of the mispricing premium over the longer term when the overvaluation will be correc。