外文翻译---中小企业融资在欧洲：介绍和概述-企业融资(编辑修改稿)

外文翻译---中小企业融资在欧洲：介绍和概述-企业融资(编辑修改稿)内容摘要：

onomic conditions deteriorate or improve. Large firms are often locked in to existing organisational structures and technologies. In sum, the higher interest rates observed on SME loans seem difficult to justify on credit risk grounds only. It could be that SMEs pay high interest rates for wrong reasons. Banks may succeed in overcharging SMEs due to limited petition in (local) banking markets and the lockin effect mentioned above. Therefore, due to finance constraints, underinvestment by SMEs may happen on a large scale while credit rationing in the strict sense of Stiglitz and Weiss 1981 does not widely occur. Wagenvoort moves beyond credit rationing and tests for financial market imperfections that may lead to finance constraints, which include credit rationing but also constraints resulting from excessive loan pricing and difficulties in raising outside equity. The empirical test of finance constraints here boils down to testing whether financial variables, such as the amount of available internal funds, have a significant impact on the firm’s investment and, thus, its growth. More precisely, Wagenvoort estimates the relationship between, on the one hand, firm growth and, on the other hand, cashflow and capital structure. A high growthcashflow sensitivity is an indication that finance is binding. The following findings are worth highlighting. Firstly, finance constraints tend to hinder the growth of small and very small firms (. firms with less than 50 employees)。 on average, the growth of these firms is onetoone related to retained profits. Secondly, while finance constraints seem to be less binding for mediumsized enterprises, their growth, in parison to the growth of large firms, nevertheless depends more on theavailability of internal funds. Thirdly, highly leveraged firms have greater difficulties in tapping external finance and, hence, exploiting their growth potential. How could one possibly improve the supply of finance to SMEs? It is useful to distinguish between public policy measures and fforts that lenders and borrowers can make to alleviate finance constraints. Wagenvoort briefly reviews the literature on the effectiveness of public lending programmes and guarantee main conclusion is that while direct lending and guarantee programmes usually benefit the recipients and help ease finance constraints, it has been questioned whether they improve the allocation of resources in an economy. Nevertheless a positive return on public intervention can be expected if intervention reduces information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders and thus helps solving information problems. For instance, public authorities may stimulate information sharing among lenders. A recent study (Jappelli and Pagano 2020) shows that information sharing among lenders increases bank lending and reduces credit risk. Borrowers and lenders themselves can also contribute to solve finance problems of SMEs by reducing information asymmetries directly. As argued above, the establishment of longterm relationships has the potential to achieve this. 安徽工程大学毕业设计（论文） 25 4. Relationship banking and bank consolidation Is there empirical evidence to support the view that relationship banking can mitigate finance constraints? Ongena and Smith (2020) report substantial variation in the average number of bankfirm relationships across European countries. The three country studies reviewed here confirm this result and they show that firms make considerable use of multiple banking. Guiso’s analysis reveals that in Italy small firms keep on average more than four bank relationships whereas large Italian firms diversify their credit needs over more than 10 credit institutions. As shown by Hommel and Schneider, the Mittelstand in Germany relies on a smaller number of bank ties but even the small German firms on average borrow from more than one lender. Very small German firms borrow on average from two banks whereas large Why is it then that SMEs keep fewer and shorter bank relationships than large firms? As credit availability improves when relationships bee longer,one would expect information opaque SMEs to stay with the same creditor(s). To begin with the number of relationships, as Dietsch notes, an obvious reason is that SMEs have to spread out fixed costs of lending over a smaller loan amount. Adding more creditors to the list of the firm’s financial intermediaries will trigger additional costs. Therefore, smaller firms may be less willing to borrow from several banks at the same time. However, the disadvantage of relying only on one bank is that this bank may turn into a monopolist over time. Dietsch explains that, although it is expensive for the smaller firms to provoke petitive behaviour of their lenders by maintaining multiple relationships, smaller firms may still break monopolies by switching banks when time passes. This may explain the relatively short duration of bankfirm relationships of smaller firms. One remark is called for. Hommel and Schneider point out that the number of initial credit offers a firm enquires about before finalising a loan contract may be more informative than the number of its relationships. This is especially the case if firms seek offers from banks they had no prior relationship with. Another important element is whether firms seek offers from banks that are not located in the area where the firms have their headquarters. Overall, the author。